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Abstract
Based on the effect of skill-biased technology change (SBTC), this
paper builds a search model with heterogeneous firms and workers to
explain the dynamics of the wage inequality in the U.S. from 1963-
2005. Firms differ in capital intensity (technology content) of the job
created and workers differ in their education level. As the match-
specific productivity is stochastic, the productivity threshold of em-
ployment of each education-job pair matched is endogenously deter-
mined. The advance in skill-biased technology increases the productiv-
ity of the highly educated workers as well as the capital intensity facing
firms when creating high-tech jobs. We argue that in response to the
rise in the capital intensity, high-tech firms increase the productivity
thresholds of hiring, which leads to wage increment in the high-tech
sector, and thus widening the residual wage inequality. Meanwhile,
the increase in the productivity of the highly educated worker in the
high-tech sector results in higher education premium in both the high-
tech and low-tech sectors. Using the historical U.S. data, calibration
shows that SBTC can explain the general trends in the education pre-
mium and the residual wage inequality from 1963-2005. In particular,
it solves the puzzle why the education premium fell but the residual
wage inequality grew in the early 1970s.
∗This is a part of my M.Phil. thesis under the guidance of Dr. Lu Chia-Hui, to whom
I am indebted. Remaining errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a variant of the standard search model to investigate the
key factors behind the dynamics of education premium and residual wage
inequality in the U.S. during the period between 1963 and 2005. Using his-
torical U.S. data to calibrate the model, we show that skill-biased technology
change (SBTC) can explain general trends of wage inequality dynamics. In
particular, our study reconciles five salient patterns of wage level and its
inequality dynamics in the U.S. in the past four decades as documented by
vast empirical studies. Specifically, the calibrated results show that: (i) the
residual wage inequality exists not only in the highly educated group but
also in the low-educated group, (ii) the residual wage inequality rises grad-
ually, (iii) the education premium first falls in the 1970s, and then rises in
the following period, (iv) the education premium has grown at a faster speed
than the residual wage inequality since the mid-1980s, and (v) a real wage
declines in the lower end of the wage distribution since 1960s. 1
In addition, the model captures stylized facts that are well documented
in the existing educational mismatch literature. In particular, the calibrated
results show that: (i) both overeducation an undereducation are persistent2,
(ii) the overeducated are paid at a higher wage than their coworkers but are
paid at a lower wage than those who possess similar education background
and work in an occupation their education level is just demanded, and (iii)
the undereducated are paid at a lower wage than their coworkers but are
paid at a higher wage than those who possess similar education background
and work in an occupation their education level is just demanded.3
We build a search model with heterogeneous workers and firms4. Work-
ers differ in their education level and firms differ in the capital intensity of
1See Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992),
Juhn et al. (1993), Card and DiNardo (2002), Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008).
2See Daly et al. (2000) for Germany, Rubb (2003) for the U.S. and Frenette (2004) for
Canada.
3See Rumberger (1987), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), Sicherman (1991), Kiker et al.
(1997), Cohn and Ng (2000), Vahey (2000), Chevalier (2003) and McGuinness and Bennett
(2007).
4This type of model matches several empirical regularities of creation and destruction
of jobs over the real business cycle. See Merz (1995) and Cole and Rogerson (1999).
However, Wong (2003) shows that Mortensen-Pissarides model fails to explain the U.S.
wage inequality. Our analysis gives an insight into the literature to explain why these
kinds of model also match several key feathers of wage inequality dynamics in the U.S.
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the job created. In contrast to the standard search model with determinis-
tic, match-independent productivity of workers, our model features match-
specific, stochastic productivity draw. The productivity of workers of differ-
ent education level is realized and becomes observable only after the worker
and firm match in the labor market. We show that the endogenous pro-
ductivity thresholds for successful employment are sufficient statistics to pin
down the equilibrium expected wage of each education-job pair matched.
As firms are competing for limited workers, and workers are competing for
limited jobs, a change of one productivity threshold in response to a change
of exogenous parameter will generate a spillover effect to the others as the
values of outside options facing firms and workers will vary accordingly. It is
shown in the paper that it is the general equilibrium effect which makes the
impacts of SBTC propagate across different sectors and labor groups.
We argue that SBTC can explain the wage inequality dynamics should
both the effect of biased productivity premium and the effect of capital in-
tensity dispersion be considered. We show that the explaining power of the
SBTC argument is crippled if either channel is omitted. A detailed discus-
sion is provided below. This section discusses the evidence on the linkage
between the U.S. wage inequality and SBTC. Section 2 presents the model
setup, followed by the steady state equilibrium analysis in section 3. Cali-
bration results are in section 4. Section 5 concludes the key findings of this
paper.
1.1 SBTC and The U.S. Wage Inequality
This subsection provides linkages between the wage inequality dynamics and
two effects of SBTC, namely biased productivity premium (BPP) effect and
capital intensity dispersion (CID) effect. Also, the key existing literature will
be reviewed in this section.
Figure 1 illustrates the U.S. wage inequality dynamics during 1963-2005
using March Current Population Surveys5. As shown in figure 1, the col-
lege/high school wage gap and the residual 90/10 wage gap, controlling the
measures of education, experience and gender, could be interpreted as educa-
tion premium and residual wage inequality respectively. Several features of
the wage inequality are demonstrated in figure 1: (i) residual wage inequality
increased gradually, (ii) education premium declined in the early 1970s and
5Data are from Autor et al. (2008).
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Figure 1: The U.S. Wage Inequality dynamics
rose in the other periods, and (iii) education premium grew more rapidly
than residual wage inequality since the 1980s. In the 1990s, studies support
the fact that SBTC is the driving force behind the wage inequality growth. A
substantial amount of studies (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy,
1992; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993) document the rise in the
wage inequality in the U.S. labor market in the 1970s and the 1980s. The
growth was first attributed to the increase in the college-high school wage
premium in the mid-1970s and the 1980s. (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz
and Murphy, 1992). However, the observed characteristics such as education,
working experience, age and gender can only explain a third of the wage in-
equality growth. Meanwhile, Juhn et al. (1993), DiNardo et al. (1996) and
Gottschalk (1997) believe that the change in the residual wage inequality can
explain most of the overall wage inequality growth. In particular, Juhn et
al. (1993) argue that the increase in the relative demand for skill caused the
residual wage inequality to rise in the 1970s and the 1980s. Krueger (1993),
Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998), Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and
Allen (2001) argue that the skill-biased technology change (SBTC) is the key
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factor behind such increase.
Nevertheless, challenges to the SBTC hypothesis have emerged since the
late 1990s. For example, as pointed out by Lemieux (2006), if SBTC increases
the demand for skill and thus widened the residual wage inequality in the
past four decades, the growth of the education premium should be recognized
as well. However, as documented in the existing literature (Juhn et al.,
1993; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006; Autor et al., 2008), the U.S.
education premium dropped in the early 1970s . This might not reconcile
with the SBTC hypothesis.
The existing literature mainly interprets SBTC as the improvement in the
productivity of the highly educated in the high-tech sector6, namely biased
productivity premium (BPP) effect. Since the skill-biased technology com-
plements the skill the highly educated possess, SBTC keeps improving the
productivity of the highly educated in the high-tech sector, generating the
BPP effect and increasing education premium. Unsurprising, our model cal-
ibration, when considering BBP effect of SBTC only, captures an increasing
trend of education premium, just as the calibration result of Wong (2003).
This provides a linkage between SBTC and education premium.
Another effect of SBTC, namely capital intensity dispersion (CID) effect,
plays an important role in determining both residual wage inequality and
education premium but is always neglected in the wage inequality literature.
Caselli (1999) also documents that the difference in the capital-labor ratio
between the 90th and the 10th percentile that has risen since the 1960s. As
shown in figure 2A, the upper end of the distribution of the capital intensity
(as measured by capital-labor ratio) rose sharply over time while it has not
changed much in the rest of the distribution.
A few works in the existing literature examine the linkage between CID
effect of SBTC and the wage inequality. This effect has largely increased the
capital intensity dispersion between the high-tech and the low-tech sectors
since the 1960s, inducing the residual wage inequality to rise (which will be
shown later). A simple empirical study by Leonardi (2007) finds that the U.S.
residual wage inequality can be explained by capital intensity. Apart from the
existing literature, we plot the dynamics of the capital intensity dispersion
and residual wage inequality during 1963-2005 in figure 2B.7 We observe
6See Juhn et al. (1993), Krueger (1993), Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998),
Bartel and Sicherman (1999), Allen (2001) and Autor et al. (2008).
7Residual wage inequality is from Autor et al. (2008). Capital intensity dispersion is
measured by the ratio of the 97.5th percentile to 2.5th percentile capital-labor ratio. Data
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Figure 2: Evidence on Capital Intensity Dispersion Effect of SBTC
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that both the capital intensity dispersion and the residual wage inequality
are moving on a similar trend. This evidence suggests that the CID effect of
SBTC increases the relative demand for skills, thereby widening the residual
wage inequality. Our calibration result shows that the CID effect of SBTC
does increase residual wage inequality during 1963-2005.
Furthermore, our calibration results indicate that the simulated education
premium and residual wage inequality are highly and positively correlated
with the historical ones only if both the BPP effect and the CID effect are
taken into account.
1.2 Related Theoretical Works
In theoretical search models of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Shi (2002),
Wong (2003) and Dolado et al. (2009), the skill-biased technology favors the
highly educated; hence, their productivity is higher in the high-tech sector.
These models predict that the BPP effect of SBTC improves the education
premium. Analogously, Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Shi (2002) and Dolado
et al. (2009) show that the BPP effect would also increase residual wage
inequality. However, according to the critique of Lemieux (2006), the SBTC
should not have reduced the education premium but at the same time in-
creased residual wage inequality in the 1970s. Therefore, the BPP effect of
the SBTC alone fails to explain the education premium dynamics in the U.S.
in the early 1970s. Shi (2002) explains that the productivity slowdown is the
driving force of the fall in the U.S. education premium in the 1970s. Anal-
ogously, Leonardi (2007) proves that the CID effect increases residual wage
inequality. Since workers are homogenous in Leonardi (2007), no education
premium issue can be examined.
Regarding the educational mismatch, not only the existing literature sup-
ports the persistence of overeducation and undereducation, but also the exis-
tence of overeducation and undereducation implies the existence of residual
wage inequality in both educated groups in the search model. Albrecht and
Vroman (2002), Leonardi (2007), Blazquez and Jansen (2008) and Dolado et
al. (2009) do not allow undereducation, generating no residual wage inequal-
ity in the low-educated group.
Amongst the related theoretical works, only Shi (2002) and Wong (2003)
allow both overeducation and undereducation. In Shi (2002), it is optimal
of capital and the number of employees are from COMPUSTAT.
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for the highly educated workers to apply to high-tech jobs only. The absence
of the overeducation implies the highly skilled only work in the high-tech
sector and are thus paid the same, inducing no residual wage inequality in
the highly educated group. In Wong (2003), both overeducation and under-
education coexist under a certain condition. In contrast, the introduction of
the stochastic match-specific productivity and the productivity distribution
of match with infinite upper bound ensures that both overeducation and un-
dereducation coexist in our model. This allows us to simulate not only the
dynamics of residual wage inequality in two educated groups, but also the
dynamics of education premium in two sectors.
Acemoglu (1998, 1999, 2002, 2003) endogenizes the decision on techno-
logical progress, and shows that the increase in the relative supply of highly
educated improves the marginal returns of R&D firms to advance the tech-
nology that complements the highly educated workers, inducing SBTC. Fur-
thermore, Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003) shows that SBTC, in response to the
sharp increase in the relative supply of the highly educated workers, increases
the residual wage inequality as to why it followed an increasing trend since
1970s. In fact, SBTC should have also improved the education premium in
the 1970s; however, Acemoglu (1998) argues that the relative supply of the
highly educated increased so suddenly that SBTC progressed but did not
respond fast enough. As a result, the effect of the increase in the relative
supply of the highly educated first dominated the effect of SBTC as to why
the education premium kept falling in the 1970s until SBTC fully responded
to the relative supply of the highly educated in the 1980s. Under the assump-
tion that the increase of the relative supply of highly educated workers is so
sudden that SBTC did not response fast enough to such increase, Acemoglu
(1998) succeeds in explaining why the education premium first declined and
then rose again.
In Acemoglu (1998), the model assumes that regardless of the ability
the highly educated workers and the low-educated workers can only work
in the high-tech sector and low-tech sector respectively. Our model relaxes
this assumption by allowing both overeducation and undereducation. In a
steady state equilibrium, our model predicts that a fraction of the highly
educated workers are willing to work in the low-tech sector because they are
compensated with wages above their outside option values. Similarly, so long
as the realized productivity is high enough, a high-tech vacancy is willing to
hire the low-educated workers because lower wages are required compared to
hiring the highly educated workers.
9
Furthermore, it is well known and is shown in figure 1 of Juhn et al.’s
(1993) paper that the real wage in the lower end of the wage distribution kept
falling in the 1970s and the 1980s. (i.e. 0 > 4wLb)8 In Acemoglu (1998), the
residual wage inequality wLg/wLb rises because 4wLg > 4wLb > 0, which is
inconsistent with the historical U.S. wage dynamics. On the contrary, our
calibration result shows that 0 > 4wLb (which will be shown later), which
captures the U.S. wage dynamics as well.
This paper develops a variant of search model to examine (i) the BPP ef-
fect, (ii) the CID effect, and (iii) the total SBTC effect on education premium
and residual wage inequality. In contrast to the existing search models of
heterogenous labors, the introduction of stochastic productivity realization
ensures the existence of undereducation and overeducation in this model.
This allows us to examine the impact of SBTC on not only the residual wage
inequality in the upper and lower end of the distribution of the residual, but
also the education premium in the low-tech and the high-tech sector. Cali-
bration examines three cases: (i) the BPP effect, (ii) the CID effect, and (iii)
the total SBTC effect. We find that the simulated residual wage inequality
and education premium are highly and positively correlated with historical
U.S. data only if both the BPP effect and CID effect are taken into account(as
shown in calibration sector), suggesting that the SBTC hypothesis and the
standard undirected search model are capable in explaining most of the wage
inequality dynamics by means of a search model.
2 Model Setup
In this model, time is continuous. Workers and firms are risk neutral and
have the same discounted rate r. Two types of worker exist in the economy,
the highly educated H and the low-educated L. The population is constant
and normalized to be one, i.e. LH + LL = 1. Two types of vacancy exist,
the low-tech vacancy b and the high-tech vacancy g, each of which can only
hire one worker. Firms are free to create vacancies. They first decide what
type of vacancy to create. They need to purchase and install the job specific
equipment kj , where kb = k and kg = σk, σ > 1 before opening a vacancy
9.
8wLb and wLg are denoted as the wage of the low-educated workers in the low-tech
sector and the high-tech sector respectively.
9Studies like Acemoglu (2001) assumes a fixed cost amount kb and kg are exogeneous
while Leonardi (2007) endogenizes these fixed costs to analyze the capital-labor ratio
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Workers and firms do not know the productivity, which is match-specific,
before they contact each other during the job search process. Let δij be
the productivity level of worker i in vacancy j, where i ∈ {H,L} and j ∈
{b, g}. The productivity of the matched worker follows a Pareto distribution
δij ∼ Pareto(a, x
¯ij
), in which the Pareto index a > 1 and the productivity
distribution has a full support over [x
¯ij
,∞), where x
¯ij
≥ 1. The cumulative
distribution function is:
Fij(δ) =
{
1− (x¯ijδ )a, for δ ≥ x¯ij;
0, for δ < x
¯ij
.
The assumption of Pareto productivity distribution captures two properties.
First, the higher the productivity, the lower will be its likelihood, i.e. f ′(δ) <
0, where f(δ) is the density function. Second, no worker generates infinite
amounts of goods, i.e. limδ→∞ f(δ) = 0.
We assume that the high-tech equipment complements the skill of the
highly educated workers while the education level does not matter in the
sector b. For simplicity, we assume that x
¯H
> x
¯L
≥ 1, where x
¯H
≡ x
¯Hg
,
and x
¯L
≡ x
¯Lg
= x
¯Hb
= x
¯Lb
. The assumption implies: (i) regardless of the
education level, a worker when matched with a vacancy b draws productivity
from the same distribution and (ii) a worker H is more capable of operating
high-tech equipment and thus able to produce more outputs than a worker
L in the sector H.10
Workers and firms realize the productivity of the match when they come
into contact. They agree to form the job match if both of them are satis-
fied with the bargaining wage. In case a worker i and a vacancy j form a
job match, δij units of output Yj are generated until a shock arrives at an
exogenous constant Poisson rate λ > 0. When this shock arrives, the worker
becomes unemployed and the job is then unfilled. If either one rejects to
form the job match for the instant, the job-seeker remains unemployed and
the vacancy remains unfilled.
In contrast to standard search models of heterogenous agents11, this model
decision of firms.
10The highly educated and the low-educated are just-qualified in the high-tech sector
and the low-tech sector respectively. The highly educated are overeducated in the low-tech
sector because their qualifications exceed the requirements of the occupation. Similarly, the
low-educated are undereducated in the high-tech sector because they lack the qualifications
required.
11See Acemoglu (2001), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Shi (2002), Wong (2003), Dolado
et al. (2009)
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does not assume homogenous productivity level of the matches; instead, it
introduces a stochastic productivity realization. This assumption captures
the match-specific component, in which the productivity of a vacancy largely
varies with workers of similar characteristics.12 As a result, a portion of
workers L possess higher productivity than worker H does, and vice versa.
2.1 Matching Technology
Let ui and vj be the unemployment of a worker i and a vacancy j respectively.
Hence, u = uH + uL and v = vb + vg are respectively the unemployment and
the amount of vacancies in the economy. The matching technology M(u, v)
is assumed to be differentiable and increasing in its arguments, concave, and
constant returns to scale. The contact rate for a vacancy can be written as
M(u, v)/v. Define q(θ) ≡ M(u, v)/v where θ ≡ v/u is the market tightness.
It is straightforward to show that the labor contact rate is M(u, v)/u =
θq(θ). Also, one can show that q(·) is a differentiable decreasing function.
Furthermore, we assume limθ→0 q(θ) =∞, limθ→0 θq(θ) = 0, limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0
and limθ→∞ θq(θ) =∞.
After a worker i and a vacancy j meet via the matching technology func-
tion, both parties realize the productivity δij of the match. When both
parties agree with the bargaining wage, they sign into a contract. Otherwise
the job-seeker remains unemployed and the vacancy remains unfilled in the
next instant.13
2.2 Labor Market
The equilibrium will be characterized through a series of Bellman equations.
Let JEij and J
U
i be the discounted present value of being employed of a worker
i in a vacancy j and the discounted present value of a worker i being unem-
ployed respectively. Let wij(δij) be the wage of the worker i in the vacancy
j. JEij (δij) is written as:
rJEij (δij) = wij(δij) + λ(J
U
i − JEij (δij)) (1)
12Jovanovic (1979) also introduces the stochastic job matchings to analyze worker
turnover.
13Empirical evidence strongly supports this job-contact effect. Interested readers are
referred to Barron (1975) and Pissarides (1986).
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A worker i receives a wage wij in a vacancy j and separates from it at a
rate λ to become unemployed. Let φv ≡ vb/v be the fraction of the low-tech
vacancies amongst all vacancies. Similarly, we can write JUi as:
rJUi = z + θq(θ){φv
∫
[max{JEib (δib), JUi } − JUi ]dFib(δib)
+(1− φv)
∫
[max{JEig(δig), JUi } − JUi ]dFig(δig)} (2)
where z is the non-market income14. Also, let JFij (δij) be the discounted
present value of a filled vacancy j that is occupied by a worker i and JVj be
the discounted present value of an unfilled vacancy j. JFij (δij) can be written
as:
rJFij (δij) = Pjδij − wij(δij) + λ(JVj − JFij (δij)) (3)
where Pj is a price of good j. A filled vacancy j receives revenue Pjδij and
rewards the worker i a wage wij(δij). Again, a filled vacancy j also separates
from the match at a rate λ to become unfilled. We may assume that Pj
depends on the relative supply of the good j. To simplify the analysis, Pb
(Pg) is assumed to be decreasing (increasing) in φv. Let φu ≡ uL/u be the
unemployment of the worker L. As for the discounted present value of being
a vacancy j, it can be written as follows:
rJVj = q(θ)[φu(
∫
max{JFLj(δLj), JVj } − JVj dFij(δLj))
+(1− φu)(
∫
max{JFHj(δHj), JVj } − JVj dFij(δHj))] (4)
Free entry ensures that vacancies are created until all rents are exhausted in
the equilibrium; hence, the following hold in the steady state equilibrium:
JVj = kj (5)
Following the literature (Acemoglu, 2001; Albrecht and Vroman, 2002;
Wong, 2003; Leonardi, 2007), wage is the one that maximizes the Nash prod-
uct (JEij (δij)− JUi (δij))β(JFij (δij)− JVj (δij))1−β to split the matching surplus,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of workers. It can be found that a
wage wij(δij) is the solution of the following equations:
JEij (δij)− JUi = β(JEij (δij)− JUi + JFij (δij)− JVj ) (6)
14The unemployment insurance can be financed by a lump sum tax payment.
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Intuitively, a worker i shares a fraction of the total matching surplus. Using
the equations (1), (3) and (6), the wage equations are as follows:
wij(δij) = rJ
U
i + β(Pjδij − rJUi − rkj) (7)
Intuitively, a worker i is compensated with their outside option values and
a fraction of the matching surplus. Using equations (1), (3) and (7), one
can easily verify that ∂JEij (δij)/∂δij > 0 and ∂J
F
ij (δij)/∂δij > 0. Hence, using
equations (6) there exists a unique reservation productivity level δRij such that
JEij (δ
R
ij) = J
U
i , J
F
ij (δ
R
ij) = J
V
j (8)
Intuitively, a worker i accepts the job offer if the discounted present value
of working in a vacancy j is at least as high as the outside option value JUi .
A vacancy j contract with a worker i only if the discounted present value of
being filled JFij (δ
R
ij) is at least as high as their outside option value J
V
j . The
uniqueness of δRij implies that a worker i and a vacancy j are willing to get into
a contract for all realized productivity levels exceeding δRij . When contacted,
a worker i and a vacancy j form a job match at the rate of 1 − F (δRij).
Write Υi(φv) as φv(1−Fib(δRib)) + (1− φv)(1−Fig(δRig)), eij as the number of
employed workers i in the vacancy j, and φe ≡ (eLb + eLg)/e as the fraction
of the low-educated employment among all the employment e. In a steady
state, following equations hold:
λ(1− u)(1− φe) = θq(θ)ΥH(φv)u(1− φu) (9)
λ(1− u)φe = θq(θ)ΥL(φv)uφu (10)
LH = (1− u)(1− φe) + u(1− φu) (11)
Equations (9) and (10) imply that uH and uL are constant respectively;
hence, equation (11) implies that φe is constant. If φe, φu, φv and δ
R
ij , ∀i, j
remain unchanged, the equations (9) and (10) also ensure that all eij are
constant in the steady state equilibrium.
3 Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is defined as value functions JEij , J
F
ij , J
U
i and J
V
j ,
wages wij, reservation productivity level δ
R
ij , the proportion of low-educated
employment φe and low-educated unemployment φu, the fraction of low-tech
14
vacancy φv, unemployment u and market tightness θ such that the equations
(1)- (6), (8)-(11) are satisfied for all i ∈ {H,L} and j ∈ {b, g}. Using the
equations (9) and (10), the steady state unemployment of the worker i are
given by:
uH =
λeH
θq(θ)ΥH(φv)
, uL =
λeL
θq(θ)ΥL(φv)
(12)
From equation (12), the steady state fraction of low-educated employment is
as follows:
φe =
ΥL(φv)φu
ΥL(φv)φu + ΥH(φv)(1− φu) ∈ (0, 1) (13)
Using equations (12) and (13) and the accounting identity e = 1− u, steady
state unemployment is obtained as follows:
u =
λ
λ+ θq(θ)[ΥL(φv)φu + ΥH(φv)(1− φu)] ∈ (0, 1) (14)
Using equations (11), (13) and (14), the fraction of low-educated unemployed
among the unemployed can be obtained as:
φu =
(1− LH)[λ+ θq(θ)ΥH(φv)]
λ+ θq(θ)(ΥH(φv)(1− LH) + ΥL(φv)LH) ∈ (0, 1) (15)
The steady state production of the goods Yj = eHjE(δHj|δHj ≥ δRHj) +
eLjE(δLj|δLj ≥ δRLj), where E(·) is an expectation operator. The match
generates output only if the realized productivity exceeds the reservation
level. Hence, on average, the observed output level of a worker i is E(δij|δij ≥
δRij) in a vacancy j. Using the equations (1), (2) and J
E
ij (δ
R
ij) = J
U
i , it is
interesting to note that the reservation wages wRij equal the outside option
value rJUi in the steady state equilibrium. Similarly, using the equations (1),
(2), (3) and (5), we have:
Pjδ
R
ij = rJ
U
i + rkj (16)
Intuitively, a contract is signed only if the realized revenue Pjδij is high
enough to cover an outside option value of a worker rJUi and rental rkj. Using
the equations (1), (2) and (7), the outside option values can be rewritten as
follows:
rJUi = z + θq(θ)[φv(
∫ ∞
δR
ib
(Pbδib − rJUi − rk)dFib(δib))
+(1− φv)(
∫ ∞
δRig
(Pgδig − rJUi − σrk)dFig(δig))] (17)
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It is straightforward to show that the outside option values straightly decrease
with φv and increasing with θ. Intuitively, the rise in φv increases the fraction
of the low-tech vacancy that generates lower returns, reducing the expected
returns of the unemployed. Also, the rise in θ increases the tightness of the
labor market, improving the chance of the workers to find a vacancy and
thus the outside option value. Using the equations (3), (4), (5) and (7), we
obtain two equilibrium conditions:
(r + λ)
(1− β)rk = q(θ)[φu(
∫ ∞
δR
Lb
(PbδLb − PbδRLb)dFLb(δLb))
+(1− φu)(
∫ ∞
δR
Hb
(PbδHb − PbδRHb)dFHb(δHb))] (18)
(r + λ)
(1− β)σrk = q(θ)[φu(
∫ ∞
δRLg
(PgδLg − PgδRLg)dFLg(δLg))
+(1− φu)(
∫ ∞
δRHg
(PgδHg − PgδRHg)dFHg(δHg))] (19)
Lemma 1. In a steady state equilibrium, a worker H possesses a higher
outside option value than a worker L. JUH > J
U
L and the high-tech goods are
more experience than the low-tech ones. Pg > Pb.
Proof. See the appendix.
A worker H, on average, generates a higher productivity level than a
worker L in the sector g. Rent-sharing ensures the worker H is rewarded
with higher average wage. Therefore, the highly educated possesses a higher
outside option value than the low-educated.
Proposition 1. Having an identical output level, the following inequalities
hold in the steady state:
1. For all δ > max{δRHj, δRLj}, wHj(δ) > wLj(δ).
2. For all δ > max{δRib, δRig}, wib(δ) < wig(δ) iff δ > (σ−1)rkβ(Pg−Pb) .
Proof. See the appendix.
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The first and the second implication of the proposition (1) compare wages
across education groups and within groups respectively. The first one implies
that with identical output level a worker H receives a higher wage than a
worker L. Intuitively, the highly educated possesses a higher outside option
value than the low-educated and hence are compensated with a higher wage.
The second implication predicts that generating the same amount of output
level, a worker i receives a higher wage in the sector g only if the output level
δij is sufficiently high such that the revenue share differentials β(Pgδig−Pbδib)
exceed the rental cost differentials (σ − 1)rk.
In the existing literature (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Shi, 2002; Blazquez
and Jansen, 2008), it is a general implication that the highly educated receive
a higher wage in the high-tech sector than in the low-tech sector because rev-
enue differentials are assumed to be higher than rental differentials. Hence,
this model gives an intuition on the condition under which a worker i indeed
receive a lower wage in the high-tech sector than in the low-tech even though
they might do similar work and generate a similar output level.
A worker i generates δij unit of output in sector j and receives a wage
wij(δij) only if δij ≥ δRij when matched. On average, the observed wage of
a worker i is E(wij(δij)|δij ≥ δRij) in the sector j. Wage inequality is taken
to be a log ratio of the average observed wages of two groups of workers.
Education premium can be written as follows:
ln
E(wHj(δ)|δ ≥ δRHj)
E(wLj(δ)|δ ≥ δRLj)
= ln
βPj
∫∞
δR
Hj
δHj−δRHjdFHj(δHj)
1−FHj(δRHj)
+ rJUH
βPj
∫∞
δR
Lj
δLj−δRLjdFLj(δLj)
1−FLj(δRLj)
+ rJUL
= ln
[a− (1− β)]rJUH + βrkj
[a− (1− β)]rJUL + βrkj
> 0 (20)
Similarly, residual wage inequality is as follows:
ln
E(wig(δ)|δ ≥ δRig)
E(wib(δ)|δ ≥ δRib)
= ln
[a− (1− β)]rJUi + βσrk
[a− (1− β)]rJUi + βrk
> 0 (21)
Education premium arises from differentials in the outside option values of
two education groups while the capital intensity dispersion (σ > 1) creates
residual wage inequality in two different education groups. Proposition (2)
summarizes the results.
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Proposition 2. The steady state equilibrium wage structure of the economy
are as follows:
1. E(wHj(δHj)|δHj ≥ δRHj) > E(wLj(δLj)|δLj ≥ δRLj)
2. E(wib(δib)|δib ≥ δRib) < E(wig(δig)|δig ≥ δRig)
The first implication compares a mean wage across education groups. It
predicts that a worker H receives a higher mean wage than a worker L within
the same sector. This implication also reconciles with educational mismatch
literature15, which supports the fact that, on average, the overeducated (un-
dereducated) are paid at a higher (lower) wage than their co-workers. In
this model, a worker H is overeducated in the sector b; hence, the overed-
ucated receives a higher mean wage than his/her co-worker in the low-tech
sector. Similar, a worker L are undereducated in the sector g; therefore, the
undereducated are paid at a lower mean wage than his/her co-worker in the
high-tech sector.
The second implication of the proposition (2) compares a mean wage
within education group. It predicts that on average a worker i receives higher
wages in the sector g than in the sector b, which is consistent with two em-
pirical findings. First, it predicts that for a worker i with identical education
background, vacancies, that pay higher wages on average, are more capi-
tal intensive, which is in accord with the empirical findings from Abowd et
al. (1999). Second, it predicts that the overeducated (undereducated) on
average receive a lower (higher) wage than those who possess similar educa-
tion background and are just-qualified. This implication completes the story
of the wage structure that is well documented in the educational mismatch
literature.16
4 Model Simulation
In this section, calibration of the BPP effect, the CID effect and the total
effect of SBTC are conducted separately using the historical U.S. data during
1963-2005. The first two calibration exercises aim to show that the wage
15See Rumberger (1987), Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), Sicherman (1991), Kiker et al.
(1997), Cohn and Ng (2000), Vahey (2000), Chevalier (2003) and McGuinness and Bennett
(2007).
16See footnote 15.
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inequality dynamics cannot be captured if either BPP effect or CID effect is
omitted as to why Wong (2003) concludes that Mortensen-Pissarides model
cannot explain the wage inequality dynamics. The last calibration result will
give a clear picture that the total effect of SBTC is capable in explaining
both the education premium and the residual wage inequality by capturing
major features of the wage inequality dynamics.
Exogenous parameters include a, λ, r, m, z, L, β, ξ, x
¯L
, x
¯H
, σ and k.
The measures of the capital-labor ratio k, the capital intensity dispersion σ
and the biased productivity premium are mainly from COMPUSTAT. In the
model, k is the capital-labor ratio of low-tech vacancies. Capital, acquired
from COMPUSTAT, is deflated using the deflator in real 2005 dollar from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The deflated capital is then divided by the
number of employees from COMPUSTAT to obtain the real capital intensity.
kp,t denotes the p percentile of the capital-labor ratio in year t.
17 We assume
that SBTC has no impact on the capital-labor ratio in the low-tech sector.18
k is the average of the 2.5th percentile capital-labor ratio k2.5,t over the period
1963-2005 as follows:
k =
1
2005− 1963
2005∑
t=1963
k2.5,t
Capital intensity is measured by the capital-labor ratio. Hence, k = 3.58 is
used as the capital intensity in the low-tech sector. σt measures the capital
intensity dispersion between a high-tech vacancy and the low-tech vacancy.
This paper takes the ratio of the 97.5th percentile capital intensity to the
2.5th percentile capital intensity as the measure of the capital intensity dis-
persion each year, i.e. σt = k97.5,t/k2.5,t.
A mean productivity is computed using an AK model, i.e ax
¯j,t
/(a− 1) =
Akj,t, where ax
¯j,t
/(a−1) is the mean of a Pareto productivity distribution, A
is a fixed production parameter and kj,t is the average capital-labor ratio in
the sector j. Hence, it is easy to deduce that the lowest realized productivity
level equals x
¯j,t
= Akj,t(a− 1)/a. To capture the biased productivity disper-
sion effect in x
¯H,t
, the lowest realized productivity level x
¯L
is normalized to
one. Then, x
¯H,t
= (a(a− 1)Akg,t/a(a− 1)Akb,t)× x
¯L
= kg,t/kb,t. kb,t and kg,t
17The 1st percentile of the capital-labor ratio is discarded because a few capital-labor
ratios are close to zero in the lower end of the distribution of the capital-labor percentile.
18From figure 2A, one can notice that the lower end of the distribution of the capital-
labor percentile has not changed much in the past 4 decades.
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are the average of the capital intensity of the bottom 5th percentile and the
top 5th percentile of the distribution respectively as follows:
kb,t =
1
5
6∑
p=2
kp,t, kg,t =
1
5
99∑
p=95
kp,t
Due to the lack of evidence on the Pareto index a, and the Pareto index
is set at a = 2. The rest of the parameters follow the existing literature. To
match the sample average for job destruction rate (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992), we set the destruction rate at λ = 0.055. Following Wong (2003), we
assume that the matching function forms as Cobb-Douglas function q(θ) =
m×θ−ξ, where ξ ∈ (0, 1), and the discount rate is set at r = 0.04 to reflect an
annual rate of 4%, the scale parameter of the job-contact function m = 0.768,
the unemployment benefit at z = 0.475, the fraction of the highly educated
as L = 0.281 and workers’ surplus share at β = 0.5. Similarly, we follow
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to set the elasticity of the matching function
at ξ = 0.5. We need to explicitly specify the function of Pj. Since Pb is
inversely related to φv, we, to simplify the analysis, take Pb = α(
1
φv
)1−γ and
Pg = (1 − α)( 11−φv )1−γ, similar to Acemoglu (2001). To reflect the equal
importance of both goods Yb and Yg, we set α = 0.5 and γ = 0.5.
Two effects (the BPP effect and CID effect) and the total effect of SBTC
are examined in the following section. Calibration results support the fact
that SBTC alone is sufficient to explain the dynamics of the education pre-
mium and the residual wage inequality in the past four decades. In addition,
we show that the explaining power of the SBTC argument on education
premium (residual wage inequality) is crippled if the biased productivity
premium effect (residual wage inequality effect) is omitted.
4.1 Biased Productivity Premium Effect
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated education premium and residual wage in-
equality under the biased productivity premium effect. The capital intensity
dispersion σ is constant in this study and is measured by its average as
follows:
σ =
1
2005− 1963
2005∑
t=1963
σt
Not surprisingly, figure 3B illustrates that education premium follows an
increasing trend under this effect, which is in line with Juhn et al. (1993),
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Wong (2003) and Autor et al. (2008). Intuitively, the BPP effect improves
the productivity of the highly educated in the high-tech sector, thereby in-
creasing the flow profit of the match and thus rewarding them with a higher
wage. Hence, the BPP effect improves the education premium in the high-
tech sector.
In addition, such increase in the average wage of the highly educated
improves rJUH . Although the BPP effect takes place in the high-tech sector,
the increase in rJUH rewards them a higher average wage in the low-tech
sector. As a result, the BPP effect ameliorates the education premium in
both sectors. From table 1, the correlations between historical U.S. education
premium and the simulated ones in two sectors are over 0.9, reflecting the
high explaining power of the BPP effect on education premium.
Proposition 3. Biased productivity premium effect of SBTC improves edu-
cation premium in both sectors.
The BPP effect of SBTC alone fails to explain residual wage inequality
dynamics in the U.S. According to table 1, the correlation between the simu-
lated residual wage inequality in the highly educated group and the historical
one is -0.9486. Figure 3a also demonstrates the falling trend of the residual
wage inequality in the highly educated group.
In Wong (2003), the model simulation predicts that the BPP effect re-
duces the residual wage inequality, which is measured by the average of the
residual wage inequality in two education groups. In our model, the BPP
effect largely reduces the residual wage inequality in the highly educated
group and does not change much of the residual wage inequality in the low-
educated group. Taking the average of the residual wage inequality in two
different education groups, the BPP effect also reduces the simulated resid-
ual wage inequality in our model. Without considering the CID effect, our
calibration result is consistent with the result from Wong (2003), in which
she concludes that the Mortensen-Pissarides model is incapable of explaining
the wage inequality in the U.S.
4.2 Capital Intensity Dispersion Effect
This section calibrates the model to examine the CID effect on residual wage
inequality and education premium. In this section, the biased productivity
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Figure 3: Simulated Results: Biased Productivity Premium Effect of SBTC
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premium x
¯H
is constant and is measured by its average as follows:
x
¯H
=
1
2005− 1963
2005∑
t=1963
x
¯H,t
As shown in figure 2, the capital intensity dispersion and the historical
residual wage inequality are moving on a similar trend. Hence, one could
expect that the simulated residual wage inequality in two education groups
are increasing as demonstrated in figure 4A. Table 1 shows that the correla-
tions between the historical residual wage inequality and the simulated ones
are over 0.8. These high and positive correlations reflect the high explaining
power of the CID effect on residual wage inequality. Intuitively, the rise in
the capital instalment cost increases the reservation thresholds δRig when a
worker i matches a vacancy g so as to cover higher installment cost kg. As a
result, the mean wage of a worker i increase in the high-tech sector, widen-
ing the wage inequality of the worker i between two sectors. In other words,
the residual wage inequality rises in both the highly educated group and the
low-educated group.
Proposition 4. Capital intensity dispersion effect of SBTC increases resid-
ual wage inequality in both educated groups and reduces education premium
in all sectors.
When considering CID effect, the simulated education premium kept
falling as shown in figure 4. In addition, table 1 shows the negative cor-
relation between the historical education premium and the simulated ones,
suggesting the incapability of the CIP effect in explaining the education pre-
mium.
4.3 Total SBTC Effect
Considering both the BPP effect and the CID effect, the simulated results,
as shown in figure 5A and 5B, illustrate that education premium was on an
increasing trend in both sectors during the period 1963-2005. In particular,
education premium falls in the mid-1970s because the CID effect dominates
the BPP effect during this period. In addition, figure 5 shows the variation
of the residual wage inequality in both the highly educated group and the
low-educated group, in which the simulated residual wage inequality increase
during 1963-2005.
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Figure 4: Simulated Results: Capital Intensity Dispersion Effect of SBTC
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Figure 5D indexes the wage inequalities based on their values in the 1970s.
Both the indexed education premium and residual wage inequality do not
change much before the 1980s. The calibration result shows that the in-
dexed education premium has grown faster than the indexed residual wage
inequality after the mid-1980s. Table 1 also shows the positive correlations
between the simulated and the historical data. We can therefore conclude
that the total SBTC effect can explain the dynamics of both the U.S. edu-
cation premium and residual wage inequality during 1963-2005.
As documented in the existing literature, wages kept falling in the lower
end of the wage distribution since 1970s. In Acemoglu (1998), the wages
increase in all the wage groups. His model succeeds in predicting the increase
in the residual wage inequality; however, such increase arises because of
4wLg > 4wLb > 0. In contrast to Acemoglu (1998), our implication of
the increase in the residual wage inequality amongst the low-educated is
4wLg > 0 > 4wLb. As illustrated in the figure 5e, in the low-tech sector the
average wage of the low-educated kept declining after mid 1960s. Proposition
(5) summarizes the result.
Proposition 5. Total effect of SBTC are as follows:
1. Residual wage inequality widens gradually during 1963-2005;
2. Education premium falls in the mid-1970s, and rises in other periods;
3. Growth in education premium surpasses that in residual wage inequality
after 1980s;
4. An average wage of the low-educated fell in the low-tech sector after
mid-1960s.
As shown in the figure 5 A-D, both overeducation and undereducation ex-
ists in the steady state equilibrium. Their existence is important to the wage
inequality literature in that overeducation and undereducation generate the
residual wage inequality in the highly educated group and the low-educated
group respectively. The wage inequality literature supports the fact that
residual wage inequality exists in both the upper and lower end of the dis-
tribution of the residuals (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Lemieux, 2006; Autor
et al., 2008). Moreover, Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) find that
residual wage inequality grows substantially among college-educated workers.
Hence, analyzing the residual wage inequality dynamics necessitates a model
25
Figure 5: Simulated Results: Total SBTC Effect
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in which both overeducation and undereducation coexist in the equilibrium.
The existing models neglect either overeducation or undereducation.19 In
contrast to these models, the introduction of stochastic productivity realiza-
tion and the productivity distribution with infinite upper bound ensures the
incidence of all types of educational mismatches in the steady state equilib-
rium, which accords with the empirical evidence (Daly et al., 2000; Rubb,
2003; Frenette, 2004) on the persistence of overeducation and undereduca-
tion.
Proposition 6. Overeducation and undereducation coexist in a steady state
equilibrium. Also, residual wage inequality exists in both the highly educated
group as well as the low-educated group.
Thus far, it is the first model calibration in the existing literature that
solely utilizes SBTC to simulate the education premium and the residual
19Acemoglu (2001) and Leonardi (2007) build the models with homogeneous workers,
thereby generating no overeducation or undereducation. Albrecht and Vroman (2002),
Blazquez and Jansen (2008) and Dolado et al. (2009) neglect the incidence of underedu-
cation. Shi (2002) proves that there does not exist any overeducation in the equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Correlation: Historical Data and Simulated Result
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wage inequality such that (i) the residual wage inequality rises gradually, (ii)
the education premium first falls in the 1970s and then rises in the following
period, (iii) the education premium has grown at faster speed than the resid-
ual wage inequality since the mid-1980s, (iv) the residual wage inequality
exists not only in the highly educated group but also in the low-educated
group, and (v) a real wage declines in the lower end of the wage distribution
since 1960s.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes two SBTC effects, biased productivity premium effect
and capital intensity dispersion effect. The biased productivity premium
improves the average productivity of the highly educated in high-tech vacan-
cies, inducing the education premium to rise. Meanwhile, more sophisticated
technology requires high-tech firms to create new vacancies at a higher in-
stalment cost. High-tech firms therefore possess higher capital-labor ratios
than before, increasing the returns to the highly educated in the high-tech
firms. As a result, the capital intensity dispersion effect causes the wages
of the highly educated to be more dispersed amongst firms with different
technologies, widening the residual inequality.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by explaining both the
education premium and the residual wage inequality solely using SBTC, con-
cluding that SBTC is sufficient to understand the U.S. wage inequality dy-
namics during 1963-2005. The calibration result explains the puzzle why the
residual wage inequality exists amongst the highly educated as well as the
low-educated, the residual wage inequality rose gradually during 1963-2005,
the education premium fell in the 1970s and rose in the other periods and
the education premium grew faster than the residual wage inequality after
the early 1980s.
6 Proof
6.1 Proof of Lemma (1)
Proof. Consider δRHj < δ
R
Lj. Differentiating [1−F (δRij)]E(δij − δRij |δij ≥ δRij) =∫∞
δRij
(x−δRij)f(x)dx with respect to δRij using Leibniz integral rule, it is straight-
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forward to show that [1 − F (δRij)]E(δij − δRij |δij ≥ δRij) is decreasing in δRij .
Equation (17) and δRHj < δ
R
Lj imply J
U
H > J
U
L . Consider δ
R
Hj = δ
R
Lj. x¯H
> x
¯L
implies JUH > J
U
L . Consider δ
R
Hj > δ
R
Lj. Equation (16) implies J
U
H > J
U
L .
Hence, we can conclude that JUH > J
U
L .
Assume
∫∞
δR
Lb
(Pbx − rJUL − rk)dFLb(x) <
∫∞
δRLg
(Pgx − rJUL − σrk)dFLg(x).
δRLb < δ
R
Lg implies Pg > Pb. Suppose δ
R
Lb ≥ δRLg. Since σ > 1, equations (16)
imply Pg > Pb.
Assume
∫∞
δR
Lb
(Pbx−rJUL −rk)dFLb(x) ≥
∫∞
δRLg
(Pgx−rJUL −σrk)dFLg(x). Us-
ing the equations (18) and (19), σ > 1 impies
∫∞
δRHg
(Pgx−rJUH−σrk)dFHg(x) >∫∞
δR
Hb
(Pbx−rJUH−rk)dFHb(x). δRHb < δRHg implies Pg > Pb. Using the equations
(16), δRHg ≥ δRHb implies Pg > Pb.
6.2 Proof of the Proposition (1)
Proof. Using wages equation (7), we acquire the wage differentials of the
worker in the same industry,
wHj(δ)− wLj(δ) = (1− β)(rJUH − rJUL )
Since rJUH > rJ
U
L , we can conclude that wHj(δ) > wLj(δ), ∀δ > x¯H . Using
wage equation (7), we acquire the residual inequality of the worker i,
wig(δ)− wib(δ) = β[δ(Pg − Pb)− (σ − 1)rk]
Hence, for all δ > max{δRib, δRig}, wib(δ) < wig(δ) iff δ > (σ−1)rkβ(P ∗g−P ∗b ) .
6.3 Proof of the Proposition (2)
Proof. Using lemma (1) and wage equation (7), we acquire the wage differ-
entials of the worker in the same industry,
ln
E(wHj(δ)|δ ≥ δRHj)
E(wLj(δ)|δ ≥ δRLj)
= ln
βPj
∫∞
δR
Hj
δHj−δRHjdFHj(δHj)
1−FHj(δRHj)
+ rJUH
βPj
∫∞
δR
Lj
δLj−δRLjdFLj(δLj)
1−FLj(δRLj)
+ rJUL
= ln
[a− (1− β)]rJUH + βrkj
[a− (1− β)]rJUL + βrkj
> 0
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Education premium arises from the differentials in the outside option values
of two education groups. Similarly, residual wage inequality is:
ln
E(wig(δ)|δ ≥ δRig)
E(wib(δ)|δ ≥ δRib)
= ln
[a− (1− β)]rJUi + βσrk
[a− (1− β)]rJUi + βrk
> 0
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